Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee
Shifting in Alaska
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court amended Civil Rule 82, the
state's unique attorney fee-shifting provision. The revision
addressessome of the practicaldeficiencies of former Rule 82, as
well as the supreme court's concern that the rule deterred a large
segment of the populationfrom access to the courts. In addition
to increasing the complexity of the rule, the supreme court has
further entrenched a fee-shifting regime that is not adequately
justified by its official orperceivedpurposes. This note concludes
that Civil Rule 82 should be subjected to critical, empirical
reevaluation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is nearly unique in the world in its approach
to attorney fees; under the American rule, each side generally bears
its own attorney fees in litigation.' In contrast, the English "loser
pays" rule, used by most other countries, requires the losing party
to pay a substantial portion of the prevailing party's attorney fees.2
Alaska is unique in the United States, since it has abandoned the
American rule in favor of a complex fee-shifting system that
ordinarily requires
the losing party to pay a portion of the winner's
3
fees.
attorney
The "litigation explosion" in the United States has recently
propelled attorney fee shifting into the public limelight. Segments
of the business community and other tort reform advocates have
called for modification or abandonment of the American rule.4
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According to these critics, the American rule does little to
discourage borderline cases and marginally motivated plaintiffs.'
They argue that requiring losing parties to pay the winners' fees
would deter plaintiffs from filing non-meritorious claims, and would
encourage -the settlement of other claims because of the higher
stakes involved with losing.6 Defenders of the American rule,
conversely, maintain that all Americans are entitled to their day in
court.' They strongly oppose a fee system that might discourage
individuals of moderate means from instituting actions to vindicate
their rights.8
Amid this national debate surrounding the future of the
American rule, Alaska has recently reevaluated the merits of its
unique fee-shifting scheme. While there are now well over 100
federal and 2,000 state fee-shifting statutes in the United States,9
Alaska is the only jurisdiction that has entirely rejected the
American rule."0 In its place, Alaska has fashioned a complex
fee-shifting arrangement that combines a partial shift in favor of
the prevailing litigant' with a federal-style offer-of-judgment
device.'" After a period of intense scrutiny, the Alaska Civil
Rules Committee in 1992 recommended substantial revisions to
Rule 82. The Alaska Supreme Court, despite input from a sizeable
Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90
MICH. L. REv. 2154,2156 (1992) (citing PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETVTIENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JusTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1, 24-25 (1991)).

5. See, e.g., Phillip S. Figa, The "American Rule" has Outlived its Usefidness:
Adopt the "English Rule,"

NAT'L

L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13.

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Roxanne Barton Conlin & Clarence L. King, Jr., Revisiting the
"Loser Pays" Issue: English Rule, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 27.
8. Id. (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714

(1967)).
A number of countries are considering reforms that would bring their legal
systems closer to the American approach. Even England, despite its heavily taxsupported legal aid system, has considered modifying the English rule. A 1991
report of Britain's Lord Chancellor called potential liability for an opponent's
litigation fees and costs "'arguably the major deterrent against taking legal
action."' Id. at 28 (quoting LORD CHANCELLOR'S

DEP'T, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL
CONDMONS FOR LEGAL AID: ELIGIBILrrY FOR CIvIL LEGAL AID 37 (1991)).
9. TOMKiNS & WILLGING, supra note 3, at 31.

10. Id. at 32.
11.
12.

ALASKA Civ.R. 82.
ALASKA CIV. R. 68.

This arrangement is often referred to as a "two-way"

shift, whereas fee-shifting schemes that award fees only to prevailing plaintiffs
employ a "one-way" shift.

1993]

ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING

contingent of the Alaska Bar to eliminate fee shifting entirely,
implemented these changes in Order No. 1118, which took effect
on July 15, 1993.
This note analyzes the Alaska fee-shifting system in detail and
argues that the state should retain the prolix mechanism in its
present form only if it improves the legal system in identifiable,
desired ways. Part II presents an overview of fee shifting in
Alaska, with particular emphasis on former Rule 82 and Rule 68.
Part HI discusses the events and criticism leading to Rule 82's
amendment. Part IV examines the amended version of Rule 82
and speculates as to its probable effects. Part V explores the
possible policy rationales for Alaska's fee-shifting system and
argues that the mechanism employed is not the best means to
achieve these results. Finally, part VI concludes that the usefulness
of amended Rule 82 must be reexamined empirically.
II.

OVERVIEW OF FEE SHIFTING IN ALASKA BEFORE THE
AMENDMENT OF RULE 82

As there is not yet any reported case law discussing the
operation of Rule 82 in its amended form, and since the new rule
retains many of the basic provisions of the prior rule, familiarity
with Alaska's pre-amendment fee-shifting scheme is essential.
Alaska's well-established practice of fee shifting can be traced back
to the territorial statutes of the early 1900's." Today, Alaska Civil
Rule 82 governs the allocation of attorney fees in conjunction with
Rule 68, an offer of settlement device. The Alaska system,
although functionally distinct from the fee taxation 4 approach
under a pure English rule, employs a similar two-way shift.
Alaska Civil Rule 82, supported by Alaska Statutes section
09.60.010' and Civil Rule 54,6 sets the general framework for
13. Gregory J. Hughes, Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An

Analysis of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 129, 143 (1974).
14. The term "taxation," as it is used in this note, refers to the process of
determining the portion of one party's litigation expenses that may be charged to

another party.
15. Alaska Statutes § 09.60.010 provides:
The supreme court shall determine by rule or order the costs, if any, that
may be allowed a prevailing party in a civil action. Unless specifically
authorized by statute or by agreement between the parties, attorney fees
may not be awarded to a party in a civil action for personal injury, death
or property damage related to .or arising out of fault, as defined in AS

09.17.900, unless the civil action is contested without trial, or fully
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attorney fee shifting. Rule 82, before its amendment, provided in
relevant part:
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the
following schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in
fixing such fees for the party recovering any money
judgment therein:
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AVERAGE CASES
Judgment and,
if awarded,
prejudgment
interest
First
Next
Next
Over

$25,000
$75,000
$400,000
$500,000

Contested Without
trial

20%
10%
10%
10%

18%
8%
6%
2%

Noncontested

10%
3%
2%
1%

Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees may be fixed by
the court in its discretion in a reasonable amount.
(2) In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate
criterion for determining the fee to be allowed to the
prevailing side, the court shall award a fee commensurate
with the amount and value of legal services rendered. An
application for attorney's fees in a default case exceeding
$50,000 must specify actual fees.
(3) The allowance of attorney's fees by the court in
conformance with the foregoing schedule is not to be
construed as fixing the fees between attorney and client.
(4) Attorney's fees upon entry of judgment by default shall
be determined by the clerk. In all other matters the court
shall determine attorney's fees. Awards not pursuant to the
schedule set forth in subparagraph (1) of this Rule shall be
made only upon motion.
(5) A motion for attorney's fees must be filed within 10
days after the date shown in the clerk's certificate of
distribution on the judgment as defined by Civil Rule 58.1.
contested as determined by the court.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (Supp. 1993).
16. Rule 54 provides in relevant part: "Except when express provision
therefore is made either in a statute of the state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs."
ALASKA Civ. R. 54(d).
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Failure to move for attorney's fees within 10 days or such
additional time as the court may allow, shall be construed7
as a waiver of the party's right to recover attorney's fees.'

Alaska's two-way fee-shifting scheme was not designed to
reimburse prevailing parties" for the full amount of attorney fees
incurred. Rule 82, rather, was intended to compensate a prevailing
party partially for the productive work done by his or her attorney." The fact that, in practice, the actual bill for attorney fees
may have been several times the size of the fee award was
considered irrelevant." Because the schedule set out in Rule
82(a)(1) usually provided the basis for taxation when the prevailing
party recovered a monetary judgment, partial compensation was the
common outcome under Alaska law. In fact, Alaska trial judges
estimated that the schedule determined the amount of taxation in
over eighty percent of cases with monetary recovery.2 ' This
percentage scheme allowed judges to expend minimal time and
resources in administering schedule-based award cases.
Before the amendment of Rule 82, however, there were many
situations in which the schedule was not used to determine the size
of a fee award. When the prevailing party did not obtain a
monetary remedy, judges had discretion to fix a reasonable fee
award. If a judge determined that a schedule-based award did
not accurately reflect the value of the legal services rendered, he or
she could also depart from the schedule. Typically, this was a
concern in equitable or mixed equity-law cases when an equitable
remedy was sought, but some monetary relief might have been
granted as well z Also, overcompensation was a concern when
large monetary recoveries were obtained with a minimum of legal
services. Likewise, undercompensation could have resulted from
hard-fought cases yielding small recoveries. In such cases, a judge

17. Alaska Civ. R. 82(a) (repealed 1993).
18. The "prevailing party" is generally "considered to be the party who has
successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one who is successful
on the 'main issue' of the action and 'in whose favor the decision or verdict is
rendered and the judgment entered."' Adoption of V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788,795 n.14
(Alaska 1974) (quoting Buza v. Columbia Lumber Co., 395 P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska
1964)).
19. State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 731 (Alaska 1972).
20. Id.
21. ToMKiNs & WILLGING, supra note 3, at 42.
22. Alaska Civ. R. 82(a)(1) (repealed 1993).
23. TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 3, at 34 n.130.
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would then award "a fee commensurate with the amount and value
of the legal services rendered."'24 The current system, as amended,
similarly allows judges to exercise their discretion when the
schedule-based award is obviously inappropriate.O
Furthermore, in special instances full compensation was
allowed under the pre-amendment rule, and this is permitted after
the amendment as well.26 Bad faith actions are one such instance.27 Public interest" plaintiffs are also permitted full recovery, while defendants who prevail in public interest litigation may
be denied any attorney fee compensation. 29
Judges additionally had discretion to disallow any attorney fee
award based upon the equities of the case or other valid reasons.3"
Moreover, the trial court retained the option of not characterizing
either party as "prevailing," thereby denying any fee recovery.31
The Alaska Supreme Court granted broad discretion to trial
court judges in making fee determinations under Rule 82. Upon
appellate review, awards made pursuant to the schedule were

presumptively valid. 2 Thus, the prevailing party was not required

24. Alaska Civ. R. 82(a)(2) (repealed 1993).
25. See ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(3); text accompanying note 120.
26. See ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(3); text accompanying note 120.
27. See, e.g., Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33,
42 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1061 (1984); Gold Bondholders Protective
Council v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 658 P.2d 776, 779 (Alaska 1983); Davis v.
Hallet, 587 P.2d 1170, 1171-72 (Alaska 1978); Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d
575, 587-88 (Alaska 1973).
28. The four criteria that determine whether a suit qualifies as one of public
interest are:
(1) Is the case designed to effectuate strong public policies?
(2) If the plaintiff succeeds will numerous people receive benefits from
the lawsuit?
(3) Can only a private party have been expected to bring the suit?
(4) Would the purported public interest litigant have sufficient economic
incentive to file suit even if the action involved only narrow issues
lacking general importance?
Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage School Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska
1990); see also Loeb v. Rasmussen, 822 P.2d 914, 921 n.18 (Alaska 1991); Citizens
Coalition For Tort Reform v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 171 (Alaska 1991).
29. See, e.g., Anchorage Daily News, 803 P.2d at 404; City of Anchorage v.
McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 993-94 (Alaska 1977); Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136
(Alaska 1974).
30. See Haskins v. Sheldon, 558 P.2d 487, 495 (Alaska 1976); Cooper v.
Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1309-11 (Alaska 1973).
31. Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 877 (Alaska 1979).
32. Babinec v. Yabuki, 799 P.2d 1325, 1337 (Alaska 1990).
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to supply itemized records of counsel's services to justify such
awards.33 A trial judge's failure to adhere to the schedule without
stating the reasons for deviating, however, constituted reversible
error.'
Upon reversal, the appellate court would ordinarily
remand the fee determination, forcing the trial judge to apply the
schedule or articulate an adequate explanation.35 But if the trial
court specified in the record its reasons for departing from the
schedule, it had broad discretion to award amounts greater than
those permitted under the schedule.36 The Alaska courts' lenient
abuse-of-discretion standard tended not to disturb trial court
awards unless the determination was "arbitrary, capricious,
manifestly unreasonable, or . . . stemmed from an improper

motive."37 Moreover, "a trial judge need not [have made] formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law to justify his decision
denying attorney's fees. An oral explanation on the record...
[was] sufficient."3 For example, an award exceeding fifty percent
of the actual attorney expenses incurred was deemed reasonable,39
but one exceeding ninety percent of the amount requested by the
prevailing party was held to be excessive when there was no
evidence that the losing party's claims were "frivolous, vexatious,
or devoid of good faith."' An award based on claimed attorney
fees that appeared to be clearly excessive required a remand for a
new fee award based upon reasonable expenditures.41
When the prevailing party recovered no monetary judgment,
appellate review differed slightly. As with monetary recoveries, a
sufficient explanation was required if the trial court refused to
award attorney fees to the prevailing party.42 A mere statement

33. Id.

34. Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985).
35. Id.
36. Taylor Constr. Servs. v. URS Co., 758 P.2d 99, 103 (Alaska 1988).
37. Alvey v. Pioneer Oilfield Servs., 648 P.2d 599, 601 (Alaska 1982); see also
Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1976); Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606,
613 (Alaska 1970).
38. Urban Dev. Co. v. Dekreon, 526 P.2d 325, 328 (Alaska 1974).
39. Stevens ex reL Park View Corp. v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389, 396 (Alaska

1988).
40. State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807, 818 (Alaska 1981).
41. Zeilinger v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co., 823 P.2d 653, 659 (Alaska
1992).
42. Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1986); see supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
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that "[u]nder the circumstances justice will best be served if each
party bears [its] own costs and attorney's fees" was not considered
a sufficient explanation.43 Generally, courts also had to explain
full attorney fee awards.'
If the trial court did award fees,
however, it did not have to supply reasons for
its judgment as long
45
as the award was only for partial expenses.
In practice, Alaska's former fee-shifting regime based upon
schedule-based taxation was deemed a "fast, uncomplicated, easily
managed enterprise" that judges conducted within minutes. 6
With schedule-based fee awards, taxation required nothing more
than a simple motion request.47 The moving party submitted
affidavits containing attorneys' billing rates and the number of
hours worked on the particular aspects of the case. Since fee
shifting had become an accepted institution in the Alaska legal
system, schedule-based awards were generally not contested.48
Not every case was so straight-forward. In approximately
twenty-five to thirty percent of the cases, the prevailing party
claimed, under Rule 82(a)(2), that the schedule was not an accurate
basis for taxation.49 In these instances, the parties would file
briefs and the judge would decide whether or not to use the
schedule. If a trial judge elected not to use the schedule, the
taxation process became even more time-consuming. The judge
had to determine what constituted a reasonable fee as well as what
percentage of it would be awarded. This procedure often entailed
longer briefs from the parties, and occasionally hearings and
discovery." The judge engaged in a similar reasonable fee and
percentage recovery determination when the prevailing party
received no monetary judgment.
Alaska judges employed varying procedures for determining
what constituted reasonable fees. Some judges carefully examined
each entry of the fee petitions for acceptability, recalculating the
number of reasonable hours after subtracting unnecessary expendi-

43. Curran v. Hastreiter, 579 P.2d 524, 530 (Alaska 1978).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Moses v. McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363, 1368-69 (Alaska 1980).
Wickwire v. Arctic Circle Air Servs., 722 P.2d 930, 935 (Alaska 1986).
TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 3, at 41-42.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 41 & n.149.
Id. at 42.
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tures of time and hours spent on non-prevailing issues. 51 Eventually, the judges drafted a fee order containing brief findings of fact
supporting the fee award.
Other judges relied on a more intuitive approach. They used
their experience and general sense of the case to estimate an
acceptable benchmark range for the total fee.52 These judges
looked at the average hourly fees in their districts and multiplied
this figure by an estimate of the number of hours required for the
type of case at hand. They compared this estimate with the
amount requested in the fee petition. A request well above the
benchmark estimate would have received closer scrutiny; otherwise,
judges often "rubber-stamped" the fee request.53 Using this
methodology, judges completed the entire taxation process in
minutes, compared with about an hour for the alternative process
outlined above.'
After calculating the total reasonable fee under either of the
two methods, judges had to determine the appropriate fraction of
this fee to shift. The Alaska Supreme Court, before amending
Rule 82, provided no set guideline for doing so. The text of former
Rule 82 called for a reasonable amount "commensurate with the
amount and value of legal services rendered."' Under this loose
standard, trial judges applied widely varying percentages for similar
types of cases, creating a high degree of unpredictability. The
proportion of fees shifted would fall anywhere between twenty and
eighty percent of the reasonable fees, and anything in this range
would generally not be reversed on appeal.56 One practitioner
observed that awards at the upper end of this range were more
common: "[t]he prevailing party defendant typically receives
between 40% and 80% of the actual attorney fees incurred."57

In sum, schedule-based taxation operated fairly smoothly and
efficiently under former Rule 82. Few schedule-based awards were
appealed, computation was a simple process, and the amount of the
51. Id. at 42-43.
52. Id. at 42, 44.
53. Id. at 44-45.

54. Id. at 44.
55. Alaska Civ. R. 82(a)(2) (repealed 1993).
56. Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Alaska: Where the Loser Pays the Winner's Fees,
JUDGES'

J., Spring 1985, at 4, 6.

57. Memorandum from Mark E. Wilkerson, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq.,
Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 2 (Oct. 15,1992) (on file with Alaska
Law Review).
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award was a predictable function of the size of the judgment.
When schedule-based computation was inappropriate, however,
greater judicial time and resources were required at the trial court
level. Additionally, the ambiguity inherent in determining a
reasonable fee resulted in a large number of appealed awards.
According to a 1982 survey, more than one-fifth of the cases
comings before the Alaska Supreme Court contained attorney fee
issues.
iS~S58

A complete discussion of the Alaska fee-shifting system also
requires consideration of the interaction between Rule 82 and Rule
68, a federal-style offer-of-judgment rule. Singly and in combination, these rules profoundly shape litigation and settlement
incentives. Rule 68 provides:
(a) At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, either
the party making a claim or the party defending against a claim
may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
be entered in complete satisfaction of the claim for money or
property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then
accrued. The offer may not be revoked in the 10 day period
following service of the offer. If within 10 days after service of
the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is
accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service, and the clerk shall
enter judgment. An offer not accepted within 10 days is
considered withdrawn and evidence of the offer is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs. The fact that an offer
is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
(b) If the judgment finally rendered by the court is not more
favorable to the offeree than the offer, the prejudgment interest
accrued up to the date judgment is entered shall be adjusted as
follows:
(1) if the offeree is the party making the claim, the interest
rate will be reduced by the amount specified in AS
09.30.065 [2% per year] and the offeree must pay the costs
and attorney's fees incurred after the making of the offer
(as would be calculated under Civil Rules 79 and 82 if the
offeror were the prevailing party). The offeree may not be
awarded costs or attorney's fees incurred after the making
of the offer.
(2) if the offeree is the party defending against the claim,
the interest rate will be increased by the amount specified
in AS 09.30.065 [2% per year].

58. TOMKINS AND WILLGING, supra note 3, at 46 n.157 (citing Note, State
Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321, 345).
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(c) When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent
of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings,
the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which
shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is
served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to
the commencement
59 of hearings to determine the amount or
extent of liability.
Under Alaska Civil Rule 68, either party may make a formal
offer of judgment to be entered for a specified amount plus costs.
In practice, however, the defendant is usually the party that makes
the offer. If the plaintiff rejects the offer and later obtains a
recovery, which, including prejudgment interest, is less than the
amount of the offer plus prejudgment interest, the defendant is
treated as the "prevailing party." Consequently, the defendant
would be entitled to attorney fees and costs from the time of the
offer since, unlike the relatively little-used Federal Rule 68,'
Alaska Rule 68 permits partial compensation for attorney fees
pursuant to Rule 82. Because costs are often minimal, the impact
of Alaska Rule 68 stems primarily from its interaction with Rule
82.61

The following example illustrates this relationship.' Defendant makes a settlement offer to Plaintiff for $50,000 plus costs and
attorney fees. If Plaintiff chooses to accept this offer, she may file
for Rule 82 attorney fees and Rule 79 costs. Using the "contested
without trial" column of the schedule in Rule 82, the fee award
equals $6,500. Adding in the minimal costs usually recoverable
under Rule 79 (assume $1,500), the total offer is worth approximately $58,000.
Suppose, however, that Plaintiff rejects the offer, proceeds to
trial and receives a judgment of only $10,000. Also, assume that
the injury occurred three years before the judgment and that the

59. ALASKA Civ. R. 68.
60. The United States Supreme Court in Marek v, Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985),
held that a plaintiff who rejects a defendant's Federal Rule 68 offer and obtains
a positive judgment less than the amount of the offer loses the right to collect
post-offer attorney fees. Id. at 10. This rule applies only to cases governed by
federal fee-shifting statutes, which are usually pro-plaintiff. Plaintiffs in the federal
system, therefore, never risk having to pay the defendant's legal fees by turning
down an offer of settlement, since there is no statutory basis for pro-defendant feeshifts.
61. Kleinfeld, supra note 56, at 5.
62. See id at 5-7 (providing the basis for the hypothetical used in this note).
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relevant interest rate was 5%. Since the award plus prejudgment
interest, approximately $11,500, is less than the $50,000 offer,
Defendant will be considered the prevailing party under Rule 82.
The result can be disastrous.
If Defendant's reasonable attorney fees are approximately
$60,000, and if he wisely made the settlement offer early in the
discovery process so that the bulk of the fees were incurred
afterwards, Plaintiff suffers a net loss from the litigation. For
example, if the court shifts 30% of the reasonable fees,' Plaintiff's
$11,500 judgment and prejudgment interest will be offset by an
$18,000 fee award to the defendant and other costs allowable under
Rule 68 (assume $200 for subpoena costs for witnesses). In
addition, Plaintiff incurred her own non-reimbursable costs (assume
$10,000 for expert witnesses) and pays her attorney whom she hired
on a contingent fee basis (assume 30% of $11,500, or $3,450). As
an end result of the litigation, Plaintiff's net loss reaches $20,150.'
But for the interplay between Rule 68 and Rule 82, Plaintiff would
have been considered the prevailing party and likely been spared
any net out-of-pocket expense.

HI. THE ROAD TOWARD

RULE 82
In the spring of 1992, Chief Justice Rabinowitz of the Alaska
Supreme 'Court appointed a subcommittee of the Civil Rules
Standing Committee to consider possible changes to Rule 82.
Specifically, the court requested that the subcommittee consider
whether Rule 82 deterred a large segment of the population from
voluntary access to the courts.
This issue came to the court's attention partly by virtue of the
supreme court's own decision in Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil
Co.6 ' John Bozarth, a pilot employed by Atlantic Richfield
("ARCO"), was discharged for refusing to participate in his
AMENDING CIVIL

63. Amended Rule 82 sets a 30% fixed rate for the portion of attorney fees
that are recoverable from non-monetary judgments. ALASKA CIV. R. 82; see also
text accompanying note 120.

64. Actually, the loss is even higher after accounting for the provision on
prejudgment interest in Rule 68. See ALASKA Civ. R. 68 (b)(1), (2). If, as in the
preceding example, Plaintiff's judgment fails to exceed the amount of the offer, the
prejudgment interest rate is lowered by 2%. This scenario would reduce her
judgment plus interest from $11,500 to $10,900. Her net loss then rises by $420,
after accounting for the contingent fee arrangement, to $20,570.
65. 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska 1992).
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employer's random drug-testing program.66 Bozarth sued, claiming that he was fired in retaliation for "whistle-blowing" activities.67 The trial court granted ARCO's motion for summary
judgment on two independent grounds." ARCO then moved for
attorney fees equal to 70% of the $156,425 in expenses actually
incurred. Finding a small overcharge, the court determined that
the full amount of reasonable fees was $152,000. The court
awarded 50% of this amount, some $76,000, as partial compensation pursuant to Rule 82.69
On appeal, in addition to contesting the summary judgment,
Bozarth opposed the attorney fee award. He argued that the $165
to $175 per hour rate charged by defense counsel was excessive. 70
The supreme court found that Bozarth had failed to present
evidence that such hourly fees were unreasonable, or that the work
performed by the attorneys was unnecessary or inappropriate.71
Additionally, the majority reasoned that the 50% proportion "[fell]
comfortably within the partially compensatory standard of Civil
Rule 82. "72 The court, therefore, held that the fee award was
valid. However, the majority pointed out that the magnitude of the
award was "nonetheless disturbing."'7 3 The court speculated that
the increased costs of litigation may have caused Rule 82 to deter
"a broad spectrum of our populace from the voluntary use of our
courts."'7 4 Accordingly, the majority called for the Civil Rules
Standing Committee to review this very question.75
Justice Matthews desired stronger medicine; he would have
reversed Bozarth as to the magnitude of the fees. The dissent
found the $76,000 award to be fundamentally at odds with the
Alaska Constitution's general protection of access to civil courts.76

66. Id.at 2-3.
67. Id.at 3.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id.at 4.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Brunet v. Dresser Olympic Div. of Dresser Indus., 660 P.2d 846,
847-48 (Alaska 1983); Stevens ex reL Park View Corp. v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389,
396 (Alaska 1988)).
73. Id.at 4 n.3.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.at 5 (citing Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1378-79
(Alaska 1988); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215,1218-21 (Alaska 1973); Malvo v. J.C.
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Justice Matthews analogized "substantial awards of partial fees
against litigants of limited resources" to full fee awards against
good-faith plaintiffs.' He reasoned that "[i]f a $10,500 attorney's
fee award is so great as to 'foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard' it has that effect independent of whether it
represents the prevailing party's full, or merely partial, fees."78
Since the Alaska Supreme Court has expressed a concern that full
fee awards against good faith plaintiffs may offend plaintiffs' due
process "right to be heard," the dissent argued that a similar
constitutional concern existed in this case as well.79 Accordingly,

the dissent would have remanded the fee determination to the
superior court for consideration of whether the award will "impair
the constitutional right of access to the courts."8
In addition to the access issue, the subcommittee took a hard
look at two other fee-shifting issues: the lack of uniformity in fee
awards when the prevailing party did not receive a monetary
judgment, and the absence of a requirement that trial judges
articulate the reasons for an award when the schedule does not
apply (absent full or nearly full fee-shifts).' At the first meeting
of the subcommittee, a majority voted that no changes to the
existing fee-shifting regime were necessary.82 Interestingly, this
initial result mirrored the prevailing opinion of the Alaska Bar.

Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973)) (Matthews, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 6 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (quoting Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973))
(Matthews, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Matthews, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Matthews, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted the frequency with
which this issue has arisen in wrongful discharge claims and suggested that awards
in such cases not exceed a fraction of the former employee's annual income. Id.
(citing Van Huff v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1992)
(affirming award of $117,251.50 against an employee despite evidence that it would
take employee 10 years to repay the fee; fee award justified by complex pretrial
discovery and fact that it was only 30% of employer's actual fees); Zeilinger v.
SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co., 823 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1992) (holding fee award of
$80,470 to employer to be excessive)) (Matthews, J., dissenting).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
82. Robert Richmond, Civil Rule 82: Status of Review 1 (unpublished
handout distributed at 1992 meeting of the Anchorage Bar Association) (on file
with the Alaska Judicial Council).
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According to a survey of the Bar conducted in March of 1992
by the Civil Rules Committee,' a majority of the respondents
opposed rescinding or substantially amending Rule 82.' Surprisingly, the responses remained relatively consistent across lines of
representation. In other words, although the strength of their
support differed somewhat, both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys
favored retention of the existing rule.
Specifically, seventy percent of survey respondents reported
that Rule 82 did not deter plaintiffs of moderate means from filing
claims.' Common explanations were that attorneys sometimes
failed to inform clients about the effect of Rule 82, that many
plaintiffs did not initially consider the possibility of losing, and that
often such plaintiffs remained unconcerned because they were
Many practitioners indicated that
ultimately judgment-proof.'
own attorney fee obligation, acted
plaintiff's
as
a
such
other factors,
as a greater deterrent than did Rule 82.' Some wrote that Rule
82 had the positive effect of deterring only frivolous or nonmeritorious claims. 8 In contrast, the minority view generally
asserted that Rule 82 deterred plaintiffs of moderate means from
filing valid claims against the government or large business entities
and contended that powerful defendants often exploited Rule 82 by
consciously incurring large attorney fees to hurt private plaintiffs.89
Over two-thirds of those surveyed indicated that former Rule
82 did not put excessive settlement pressure on moderate income

83. The survey presented "yes or no" questions with space for respondents to
supplement their answers with written comments. A summary of these comments,
in conjunction with the numerical percentages, provides a great deal of insight into
the perceived effects of former Rule 82. See Memorandum from Douglas Phillips
& David Greene, Law Clerks, to The Honorable Daniel A. Moore, Jr., Alaska
Supreme Court (May 4, 1992) (on file with Alaska Law Review) [hereinafter
"Phillips & Greene Memorandum"].
Although the questionnaire is a useful source of information regarding how
Rule 82 functions in practice, it should be remembered that attorneys' interests are
not always aligned with those of their clients, who bear the financial burden of
Rule 82's sanctions. See infra notes 168-173, 196-197, and accompanying text.
84. See infra Appendix for a ful summary of the survey's numerical results for

"yes or no" questions.

85. See infra Appendix (referring to question one).

86. Phillips & Greene Memorandum, supra note 83, at 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id.
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litigants.90 Rather, many attorneys noted that Rule 82 required
plaintiffs to assess their claims more realistically, which would often
result in the settlement of weaker claims.9' Respondents who did

feel that the settlement pressure was excessive frequently remarked
that the amount of that pressure varied depending on the wealth of
the opposing party. Thus, insurance companies and other large
institutional defendants could exert tremendous pressure since they
were able to spend more on their defense. Some such respondents
commented that Rule 82 imposed devastating results in cases that
did not settle.'
When asked straight-out whether they favored rescinding Rule93
82, an overwhelming majority of respondents favored retention.
In written comments, practitioners praised the rule for encouraging
settlement and deterring frivolous litigation.94 They also remarked
that the rule's official rationale, to compensate the prevailing party
partially, was an inherently fair result.
Abolitionists argued,
conversely, that "Rule 82 is unfair to those of moderate means
because it deters them from bringing valid claims., 96 In one
attorney's opinion, "[w]ealthy business corporations and insurance
carriers are unfazed by the rule, while those of moderate means
quake in their shoes at the thought of losing their homes. '
Some plaintiffs' attorneys indicated that the structure of former
Rule 82 allowed defendants to receive more than plaintiffs, who
could recoup attorney fees generally only to the extent that the
schedule provided. 98 Some additionally criticized the rule as being
too subjective since it failed to provide guidance as to what
constitutes an appropriate award.' The judicially created public
interest exception also received criticism for not comporting with
the underlying rationale of Rule 82."°
Although attorneys resoundingly favored retaining Rule 82, the
most significant divergence of opinion between plaintiffs' and
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra Appendix (referring to question two).
See Phillips & Greene Memorandum, supra note 83, at 4.
Id.; see also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix (referring to question four).
See Phillips & Greene Memorandum, supra note 83, at 6.
I&
1&

97. I&

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 7; see infra text accompanying note 184.
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defense lawyers occurred over the questions that specifically
focused on elements of the Bozarth access issue. TWo-thirds of the
respondents felt that the courts should not consider a party's ability
to pay when taxing fees.'' Many practitioners argued that
fairness required the rule to be applied uniformly or not at all."°
Others worried that consideration of a party's ability to pay would
have the following negative effects: add too much complexity to
the system; "encourage perpetual litigants and spurious suits;"'13
create too much uncertainty, thereby hampering settlements; or
turn the proceedings into a "welfare contest."'' " Proponents of
the ability-to-pay criterion, on the other hand, generally indicated
that this consideration was essential to preserving access to the
courts.'05 Several of these commentors noted that former Rule
82 had driven some plaintiffs into bankruptcy.'"
Finally, attorneys offered additional comments that focused on
the underlying purposes of Rule 82.'" One frequent comment
was that Rule 82 was not intended to be a weapon against frivolous
litigation.' 3 Rule 82 was designed to compensate prevailing
parties only partially, and if deterrence of frivolous litigation is
desired, there should be a separate rule earmarked with this
particular goal." 9 Many respondents commented that any such rule
aimed at deterring frivolous litigation should focus on attorneys,
Since attorneys are better able to
rather than on their clients.'
judge whether a claim has merit, Alaska Civil Rule 11 is the proper
means for deterring frivolous litigation, according to many."'
Finally, some respondents remarked that the subjective and
unpredictable application of Rule 82 precluded any deterrence
effect whatsoever." 2
After reconsideration and weighing of the preceding concerns,
the Civil Rules subcommittee recommended revising Rule 82. The

101. See infra Appendix (referring to question five).
102. Phillips & Greene Memorandum, supra note 83, at 8.
103. Id.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
See infra Appendix (referring to question three) and note 212.
Phillips & Greene Memorandum, supra note 83, at 5.
I.
Id.
Id.

112. Id.
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proposed changes addressed two primary concerns: "(1) the lack of
uniformity in fee awards when the prevailing party does not
recover a money judgment; and (2) the absence of a requirement
that trial judges articulate the reasons for an award."" 3 The
subcommittee suggested applying a fixed percentage of reasonable
fees incurred, either thirty or thirty-five percent, to calculate nonschedule based awards." 4 Additionally, the subcommittee recommended the following set of factors to be considered by the trial
court in deviating from the schedule or the fixed percentage: the
complexity of the litigation, length of the trial, reasonableness of
the attorneys' hourly rates, reasonableness of the number of
attorneys used, diligence in efforts to minimize fees, willingness to
reach a settlement agreement, reasonableness of claims and
defenses pursued by each side, the relationship between the amount
of work performed and significance of the matters at stake, as well
as other relevant equitable factors."5 Any variation would have
to be explained in reference to these factors. 6
The subcommittee specifically rejected adding an equitable
factor to Rule 82 that would address the Bozarth access issue.
Members speculated that an ability-to-pay factor would generate
too much additional litigation and undermine the uniformity and
fairness of Rule 82.11 The Civil Rules Committee then voted to
recommend that the Alaska Supreme Court adopt the
subcommittee's proposed changes."1
On January 7, 1993, the Alaska Supreme Court issued Order
No. 1118, which amended Civil Rule 82.11' While the court
adopted most of the subcommittee's recommendations, it also
introduced a factor allowing trial judges to consider the nonprevailing party's ability to pay the opponent's fees. The order
provides in relevant part:

113. Memorandum from Christine Johnson, Esq., Court Rules Attorney, Alaska
Court System, to Active Members of the Alaska Bar Association 1 (Sept. 24,1992)
(on file with Alaska Law Review).
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.at 2-3.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. This vote was not unanimous; several members voted to eliminate the
rule entirely, and two members voted to exclude the list of equitable factors. Id.
119. Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118 (Jan. 7,1993) (amending Civil Rule
82 and Civil Rule 79). Justice Rabinowitz alone did not support amending Rule
82. Id. at 5-6 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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Civil Rule 82 is repealed and reenacted to provide:
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party.
Except as otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the
parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded
attorney's fees calculated under this rule.
(b) Amount of Award
(1) The court shall adhere to the following schedule in
fixing the award of attorney's fees to a party recovering
a money judgment in a case:
[Schedule identical to that in former Rule 82]
(2) In cases in which the prevailing party recovers no
money judgment, the court shall award the prevailing
party in a case which goes to trial 30 percent of the
prevailing party's actual attorney's fees which were
necessarily incurred, and shall award the prevailing party
in a case resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual
attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred. The
actual fees shall include fees for legal work customarily
performed by an attorney but which was delegated to
and performed by an investigator, paralegal, or law clerk.
(3) The court may vary an attorney's fee award calculated under subparagraph (b)(1) or (2) of this rule iff upon
consideration of the factors listed below, the court determines a variation is warranted:
(A) the complexity of the litigation;
(B) the length of trial;
(C) the reasonableness of the attorneys' hourly
rates and the number of hours expended;
(D) the reasonableness of the number of attorneys
used;
(E) the attorneys' efforts to minimize fees;
(F) the reasonableness of the claims and defenses
pursued by each side;
(G) vexatious or bad faith conduct;
(H) the relationship between the amount of work
performed and the significance of the matters at
stake;
(I) the extent to which a given fee award may be
so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it
would deter similarly situated litigants from the
voluntary use of the courts;
(J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the
prevailing party suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart from the case at
bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by
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others against the prevailing party or its insurer;
and
(K) other equitable factors deemed relevant.
If the court varies an award, the court shall explain the
reasons for its variation.

(e) Effect of Rule. The allowance of attorney's fees by the
court in conformance with this rule shall not be construed
as fixing the fees between attorney and client.
2. By adopting these amendments to Civil Rule 82, the court
intends no change in existing Alaska law regarding the award of
attorney's fees for or against a public interest litigant,.., or in
the law that an award of full attorney's fees is manifestly
unreasonable in the absence of bad faith or vexatious conduct by
the non-prevailing party."O
IV.

AaENDED RULE 82 AND ITS PROBABLE EFFECTS

Amended Rule 82, which became effective on July 15, 1993,
changed the Alaska fee taxation scheme significantly. First, and
perhaps foremost, the new rule dispenses with the wide flexibility
that trial judges had to determine the appropriate percentage of
fees to tax when the prevailing party did not recover a monetary
judgment. Instead, amended Rule 82 fixes non-schedule based
recovery at "30 percent of the prevailing party's actual attorney's
fees which were necessarily incurred" for cases going to trial, and
20 percent for cases not going to trial.'21 Procedurally, Rule 82
still requires trial courts to scrutinize fee petitions to verify that the
attorney's fee represents actual expenses necessarily incurred. 1"
Although the language of the new rule is slightly modified, it
appears that judges will engage in the same basic reasonableness
determination that occurred under the pre-amendment rule. The
real difference is that absent variation under subsection three,
judges no longer estimate the appropriate fraction of the fee to
shift.

The effect of this new standard clearly benefits plaintiffs vis-avis defendants. Prevailing plaintiffs, who receive monetary
judgments, still receive their awards based on the schedule, which
120.

ALASKA Civ. R. 82.
121. ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(2).
122. See supratext accompanying notes 50-54.
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remains the same as under the pre-amendment rule. With this
provision, plaintiffs will also be able to predict more accurately the
size of the fee award that they will be responsible for should they
lose. Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, no longer should
receive awards in the range of forty to eighty percent of their
actual fees, which was common under the former regime." One
Alaska attorney observed that "a review of [s]upreme [c]ourt
opinions reveals that the typical award of attorney's fees is usually
closer to fifty percent than to thirty or thirty-five percent."' 24
Another defense practitioner argued that "creating a cap at
anything less than 60% of actual attorneys' fees encourages nonmeritorious litigation, reduces the chance of early settlement, and
maximizes the chances of a full trial, at considerable expense to the
parties and the court system."'" Although it seems improbable
that the new standard tilts the balance of power far enough to have
such drastic effects on the litigation process, the provision obviously
is designed to address the Bozarth access issue by limiting the size
of defense awards.
Plaintiffs have a bona fide complaint, however, that the
structure of the amended rule continues to institutionalize inequitable fee awards favoring defendants. By confining prevailing
plaintiffs to the schedule while allowing prevailing defendants to
recover a fixed, albeit lower than pre-amendment, percentage of
their actual fees, gross disparity can result between the two parties'
potential fee recoveries. Consider the following hypothetical posed
by a practitioner:
For instance in a personal injury case where there was a
$50,000.00 judgment, a prevailing plaintiff would receive ...a
total award of about $7,500.00. In the same hypothetical, if a
plaintiff's verdict did not exceed defense offers of judgment, the
trial court [would] award defendant prevailing party attorney
fees based on [thirty percent] of actual [post-offer] fees. In my
experience, actual defense costs in a moderate-size personal
injury case start at $30,000.00 and escalate rapidly. In this
example, I cannot foresee an instance where a prevailing

123. See supra text accompanying note 57.
124. Memorandum from Jon T. Givens, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq., Court
Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 1 (Oct. 9, 1992) (on file with Alaska Law
Review).

125. Memorandum from Mark E. Wilkerson, supra note 57, at 2.
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defendant would not obtain a substantially larger award than a
prevailing plaintiff" 6

The imbalance appears especially acute in the preceding hypothetical since there is both a monetary award, from which a schedulebased calculation can be made, and a prevailing defendant,
requiring application of the new fixed-rate standard. This imbalance also exists independently of Rule 68. One attorney estimated
that in the vast majority of small cases, thirty percent of the actual
defense fees will far exceed the amount of attorney fees the
prevailing plaintiff can recoup under the schedule. 27 While the
ideology behind the new fixed rate for non-monetary judgments is
a valid consideration, the amendment may fail to redress adequately the inherent asymmetry between the schedule and fixed-rate
methods of fee taxation for plaintiffs and defendants respectively.
Another major change to Rule 82 is the addition of a list of
factors under which trial courts may vary awards calculated under
either the schedule or the fixed-rate approach." The Civil Rules
Committee recommended the inclusion of many of these factors as
a means of guiding judges when the schedule or fixed percentage
seems inappropriate. 29 The factors generally address the unique
aspects of the litigation at issue, the reasonableness of the parties'
behavior, and the considerations of vexatiousness, bad faith, or
other improper motive-all legitimate bases for deviating from the
schedule according to the case law surrounding former Rule 82130
The amended rule also contains a more controversial factor
that allows trial judges to consider "the extent to which a given fee
award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would
deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the
courts."''

The rule's wording targets the Bozarth access issue,

but it does not articulate any specific standard for trial judges to
apply. This vagueness may be intended to avoid the criticism that
the "relative ability to pay" and "ability to pay" criteria garnered

126. Memorandum from Loren Domke, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq., Court
Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 1-2 (Oct. 2,1992) (on file with Alaska Law
Review).
127. Memorandum from J. Glen Harper, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq., Court
Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 2 (Oct. 14, 1992) (on file with Alaska Law
Review).
128. ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(3).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 115-116.
130. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.

131.

ALASKA

Civ. R. 82(b)(3)(I).
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from the Alaska Bar."' However, the Civil Rules Committee
rejected even the spirit of the Bozarth criteria for the reasons that
they would create an unfair lack of uniformity and "would generate
33
too much additional litigation.'
Indeed, how will a trial judge be able to determine when an
award will have a deterrent effect on subsequent plaintiffs without
engaging in an in-depth review of the parties' individual ability to
pay? In all likelihood, future adjudicators will need to look at
financial statements of losing plaintiffs. As a result, the relative
financial strength of such plaintiffs compared to large institutional
defendants may be used as a proxy for identifying particular
situations where future litigants are likely to be deterred (e.g., the
employment law context). This provision is sure to generate a
considerable amount of spin-off litigation.
The inclusion of a laundry list of other equitable factors is also
certain to generate a new body of case law. On the positive side,
setting out the factors in the text of the rule could increase the
uniformity of the reasoning process among judges exercising their
equitable powers. Accordingly, fee awards might become more
predictable. Common sense, however, dictates that subparagraph
(b)(3) will spawn numerous appeals where trial judges "failed to
take into consideration one factor or another, or placed too much
emphasis on some factor or considered a factor which was not truly
an 'equitable factor' under [subpart (K)]." 134 Given the sheer
number of these factors and their vague wording, virtually any
prevailing party will be able to find an avenue to request enhanced
fees.'35 Justice Rabinowitz, in his dissent from the court's amendments of Rule 82, foresaw that these new provisions "will unnecessarily and dramatically increase litigation over attorney's fees
awards both in our trial courts as well as in this court."' 36 Any
attorney "worth his or her salt" will request variations from either
the schedule or the fixed rate. 37

132. See supra text accompanying notes 101-104.
133. Memorandum from Christine Johnson, supra note 113, at 1.
134. Memorandum from James M. Powell, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq.,
Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 2 (Oct. 9, 1992) (on file with Alaska
Law Review).
135. Memorandum from Loren Domke, supra note 126, at 2.
136. Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118, at 5-6 (Jan. 7, 1993) (Rabinowitz,
J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 6 n.2 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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An additional noteworthy change to Rule 82 involves the
addition of a provision that allows the parties to "contract around"
the rule privately. The amended rule states that a prevailing party
is generally awarded attorney fees "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by law or agreed to by the parties.138 Thus, parties now can
decide to adopt the American rule, or some other alternative, if it
better serves their mutual purposes. The reasoning behind this
provision appears to be that parties are aware of the peculiarities
of their transaction or relationship and are therefore better able to
tailor a fee arrangement to fit the nature of their anticipated
litigation. Assuming that transaction costs are not prohibitively
high, and that parties will contract around Rule 82 on occasion,
settlement rates will theoretically approach those of jurisdictions
with different legal rules.139 This provision should encourage the
Alaska Bar to develop a highly refined body of contractual
language that would be widely used and, in some circumstances,
more efficient than the existing rule.
Finally, the amended version of Rule 82 alters the treatment
of paralegal expenses. Previously, several opinions of the Alaska
Supreme Court held that paralegal expenses are a cost item treated
under Civil Rule 79(b)."4 Consequently, trial judges often had
to handle appeals concerning paralegal costs in a proceeding
separate from the attorney fee taxation under Rule 82.141 Rule
82(b)(2) rectifies this situation by including "fees for legal work
customarily performed by an attorney but which was delegated to
and performed by an investigator, paralegal or law clerk" as actual
fees. 42 This new provision will streamline the process for computing paralegal expenses by treating them as a portion of normal

138. ALASKA Civ. R. 82(a) (emphasis added).
139. See John J.Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and
Shavell Can'tRemember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093,
1095 (1991) (discussing the Coase Theorem, which implies that litigants will select
a fee-allocation rule that generates greater total expected wealth).
140. E.g., Yurioff v. American Honda Motor Co., 803 P.2d 386,390-91 (Alaska
1990); CTA Architects v. Active Erectors & Installers, Inc., 781 P.2d 1364, 1367
(Alaska 1989); Smith v. Shortall, 732 P.2d 548, 550 n.1 (Alaska 1987); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. State, 723 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Alaska 1986); see also Memorandum
from Ed Husted, Lawyer Support Services, to Christine Johnson, Esq., Court
Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 1 (citing Frontier Cos. v. Jack White Co.,
818 P.2d 645, 653 (Alaska 1991)) (on file with Alaska Law Review).
141. Memorandum from Ed Husted, supra note 140, at 3.
142. ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(2).
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legal fees; trial judges will engage in a single review of all legal
services rendered to the prevailing party.'4 3 In addition to
producing greater administrative efficiency, this provision may well
reduce the size of legal fees by encouraging firms to use paralegals
144
for genuine surrogate attorney work-at a greatly reduced cost.
Finally, as one attorney noted, this revision will eliminate the
practice of using paralegals for needless administrative tasks, since
it will no longer be possible to obtain reimbursement for these
overhead clerical services under Rule 79.145
V. THE UNDERLYING RATIONALES FOR FEE SHIFTING IN
ALASKA-IS RULE 82 THE PROPER MECHANISM FOR
ACHIEVING THESE GOALS?
Although Alaska's fee-shifting system has grown more complex
over the years, with a vast body of case law and several amendments, the official purpose of Rule 82 has remained the same:
partial compensation of the prevailing party's attorney expenses.'
The debate preceding the recent amendment to Rule 82,
however, confirms that fee shifting remains in effect in Alaska not
merely because of its stated purpose, but rather because of its total
perceived beneficial effects on the litigation process: a greater level
of fairness, indemnity of the winner, a punitive function, a "private
attorney general" effect, and a settlement incentive.'4 7 Despite
the desirability of each of these rationales, Rule 82, in its past or
present form, is not the most effective mechanism for achieving
these results.

143. Memorandum from Ed Husted, supra note 140, at 3.
144. Id.
145. Memorandum from John Suddock, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq., Court
Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 1-2 (Oct. 3, 1992) (on file with Alaska Law
Review).
146. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
147. The author has arrived at these rationales by consulting written responses
from the Civil Rules Committee Rule 82 questionnaire, see Phillips & Greene
Memorandum, supra note 83; comments of the Civil Rules Subcommittee, see
Memorandum from Christine Johnson, supra note 113; and memoranda from the
Alaska Bar which helped shape the amended version of Rule 82, see, e.g.,
Memorandum from Robert M. Libbey, infra note 153; Memorandum from Allison
Mendel, infra note 167. The categories represent the fee-shifting goals most
frequently articulated by these sources. See also generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A CriticalOverview, 1982 DUKE L.J.

651 (1982).
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A. Fairness and Indemnity
Rule 82 was not designed to punish the losing party for
pursuing a good faith claim or defense, but rather to indemnify the
The purpose articulated by the Alaska
winner partially."
Supreme Court, on its face, is tautological-justice simply requires
partial indemnity.14 9 The most persuasive underlying argument
for indemnity is that the prevailing party, by virtue of being
adjudged legally in the right, should not be required to absorb all
of the costs incurred in vindicating his or her position. 5 The
problem with this rationale, however, is that the funds used to
indemnify come from the losing party's pocket. While the winner
may have an equitable justification for reimbursement, the loser
often has a cogent conflicting equity: "[a] defeated party... may
frequently appear to have been justified and reasonable in pressing
a strong but ultimately unsuccessful claim or defense."' 51 Although the Alaska scheme attempts to accommodate this tension
by allowing only partial indemnity, even a fraction of a large
corporate defendant's fees is sizeable enough to deter small
plaintiffs from using the courts or, in the alternative, to drive them
into bankruptcy.
Litigation outcomes are often unpredictable, and the right to
have one's day in court is a central concern of the American legal
system. Ninth Circuit Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, while still a
plaintiffs' attorney in Alaska, observed: "Attorneys' fee awards
imply that the loser should have recognized that the winner was
right, and not fought the claim. The implication is often unfair in
contract (and tort) claims where considerable justice can be found
on both sides."' 52 The following commentary provided by another Alaska attorney describes the resulting inequity:
[T]he harshness of the rule as it falls on some persons with
legitimate claims for reliet is an inequity that the judicial system
can do without. I have seen a number of people driven into
148. "The purpose of Civil Rule 82 is to partially compensate a prevailing party
for the costs and fees incurred where such compensation is justified and not to
penalize a party for litigatinga good faith claim." Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., 512
P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973) (emphasis added).
149. Rowe, supra note 147, at 654.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 655.
152. Andrew J. Kleinfeld, On Shifting Attorneys' Fees in Alaska: A Rebuttal,
JUDGES' J., Summer 1985, at 39, 41.
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bankruptcy by an adverse ruling in a case that clearly deserved
a determination of the merits. Yet, the cost judgment drove a
middle class family with modest means into bankruptcy. Such
harsh results inevitably lead to a restriction on the access to our
judicial system."
Amended Rule 82 addresses the access issue by fixing the nonmonetary judgment recovery at thirty percent of the actual fees and
by including a deterrence factor via equitable variation. As
discussed previously, however, there still seems to be an imbalance
between the size of schedule-based awards, which usually go to
prevailing plaintiffs, and fixed-rate awards, which are typically
recoverable by prevailing defendants."5 Moreover, it is questionable to what extent the Bozarth access factor 55 will succeed in
preventing the prospect of large fee awards from deterring plaintiffs
of moderate means from using the courts. There also remains a
strong possibility that non-prevailing parties will be forced into
bankruptcy merely by bringing a losing claim or defense in good
faith. Accordingly, it is debatable whether Rule 82, even as
amended, leads to litigation outcomes fairer than those which
typically occur under the American rule. 56
The indemnity argument further breaks down when a party
who receives a favorable court judgment becomes a "losing" party
because the size of the award does not exceed the amount of a
Rule 68 settlement offer.'57 Rule 68 is designed as a settlement
device, but to the extent that it shifts attorney fees in addition to
costs, it should comport with the articulated partial-indemnity
rationale of Rule 82 as well. While one may plausibly assert that
trials usually achieve the fair result as to liability, it is a stretch to
argue that the amount of monetary judgment accurately gauges the
legitimacy of the claim or defense. "It is arbitrary to penalize
litigants who made offers within the average [or rejected offers
outside the average], but lost because their particular case did not

153. Memorandum from Robert M. Libbey, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq.,
Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System I (Oct. 5, 1992) (on file with Alaska
Law Review).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 126-127.
155. See ALAsKA Civ. R. 82(b)(3)(I).
156. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1634-35 (1993)
("Litigation of basic rights [is] not to be discouraged by rules that den[y] access
to the courts.").
157. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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produce the average result."' 8 Often, the amount of the offer
barely exceeds the judgment, but being close makes no difference.
"It is like a sporting contest where one side gets the trophy
whether the score was 7 to 6 or 7 to ."'"5 Moreover, litigants
rely on their attorneys' advice in valuing their claims; but it is the
client, not the attorney, who shoulders the burden when the
judgment falls short of the Rule 68 offer.
In sum, partial indemnity of the prevailing party is unconvincing as the articulated purpose of Rule 82. Even the Alaska
Supreme Court realizes this, since it has carved out exceptions to
the rule for public interest litigants,"6 decreased the percentage
161
of actual fees that prevailing defendants are entitled to recover,
and added language that allows trial judges to consider equitable
factors such as the access issue in setting fee awards.' 62
B. Punitive Function and Deterrence of Frivolous Litigation
Alaska recognizes a common law exception to the precept that
only partial fees may be shifted under Rule 82: "[flull or substantially full attorney's fees may be awarded if the trial court finds that
the losing party acted in bad faith in asserting a claim or deThis policy resembles the federal courts' bad faith
fense."' 6'
exception to the American rule, which applies when "a party
refuses to recognize a clear legal right or engages in bad faith
conduct in litigation."' ' 4
While penalizing bad faith litigation seems justified, it is not
clear that fee shifting provides the optimal measure of deterrence
or punishment. The strongest scenario supporting this policy is
when the misconduct itself causes unnecessary legal expenses.
Often, however, even if no additional legal expenses are incurred,

158. Memorandum from Paul W. Waggoner, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq.,
Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 1 (Oct. 6, 1992) (on file with Alaska

Law Review).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Loeb v. Rasmussen, 822 P.2d 914, 921 n.18 (Alaska 1991);
Citizens Coalition For Tort Reform v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162,171 (Alaska 1991);
Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage School Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska
1990).
161. ALASKA Civ. R. 82 (b)(2).
162. ALASKA CIv. R. 82 (b)(3).
163. Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 42 n.9
(Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
164. Sge Rowe, supra note 147, at 661.
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vexatious litigation imposes a host of external costs such as

delaying other litigants' cases and burdening the court system.
Moreover, Rule 82's deterrence effect may depend more on the
wealth of the party than on the strength of the claim or defense."6 The rule will not deter parties who are judgment-proof,
no matter how misguided the suit."6 Similarly, wealthy parties
are likely to remain undaunted. However, "[m]iddle income
plaintiffs who may have viable and well-founded lawsuits may be
deterred because of the potentially disastrous consequences of a fee
award against them."'67 Therefore, Alaska's fee-shifting regime
may not provide the most effective means of punishment in many
contexts.
Another significant problem with the deterrence rationale is
that punitive fee shifts under Rule 82 punish the losing party for
conduct that is the attorney's responsibility. It is the attorney, not
the client, who is trained to decide whether or not a claim has
merit. Alaska Civil Rule 11, which directs sanctions at the
attorney, is the proper means to combat frivolous litigation."s
The purpose of Rule 11 is to encourage the good faith
behavior of counsel "by holding them strictly accountable for all
165. An empirical study of the effects of a two-way fee-shifting statute applied
to medical malpractice cases in Florida concluded that plaintiffs dropped more
claims under the English rule than under the American rule, but that the tendency
of the former to increase defense expenditures suggests that risk aversion, rather
than lack of merit, might be the primary incentive for abandoning these claims.
Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal
Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 377-78 (1990); see
also infra note 185.
166. One author observes that since successful defendants are unable to collect
their fees from insolvent plaintiffs, the Alaska system, in practice, results in a oneway shift in favor of bankrupt complainants. Vargo, supra note 156, at 1624.
167. Memorandum from Allison Mendel, Esq., to Christine Johnson, Esq.,
Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System 1-2 (Oct. 15, 1992) (on file with
Alaska Law Review).
168. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an
The
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record ....
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless expense in the cost of litigation.
ALAsKA Civ. R. 11.
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allegations contained in the complaint."' 69 Before 1989, the rule
mandated that the trial court impose "'an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the ffling
of the pleadings, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."" 7 This language is identical to that contained in
the federal version of Rule 11.171 The 1989 amendment to
Alaska's Rule 11, however, diluted the strength of this already
weak rule by removing the mandatory sanction provision.
Currently, when bad faith litigation occurs, the client typically
bears the brunt of the penalty in the form of full attorney fees
under Rule 82. In contrast, the attorney often receives a token
penalty.'72 In the Civil Rules Committee questionnaire, many
respondents commented that deterrence of frivolous litigation was
an inappropriate goal of Rule 82 and instead advocated the use of
stronger sanctions under Rule 11."7 The fact that a number of
respondents favored more stringent sanctions on themselves,
combined with the obvious reality that attorneys are more
accountable for the methods of litigation than are their clients,
demonstrates that a stronger Rule 11 is a better weapon against
frivolous or bad faith litigation than imposing full attorney fee
expenses on the hapless client.
C. Private Attorney General Effect
Public interest litigation is another common law exception to
the norm of partial fee recovery by the prevailing party. The
amendment to Rule 82 preserves this exception, 74 which allows
full recovery of fees to prevailing public interest plaintiffs (even if
they prevail only on one of many theories) and denies any
reimbursement to defendants who win in public interest litiga-

169. Sanuita v. Common Laborer's and Hod Carrier's Union, 402 P.2d 199,200
(Alaska 1965).
170. Alaska Civ. R. 11 (amended 1989).
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
172. See Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 659 (Alaska 1989) (rejecting an
argument that a $100 Rule 11 sanction was too low compared to the attorney fees
imposed against the attorney's client; sanction carried with it a stigma and a
message of disapproval, and the trial court reasonably could have considered this
penalty sufficient to punish the attorney for his conduct).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 108-111.
174. See Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118, at 4 (Jan. 7, 1993).
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tion. 75 The evolution of this doctrine began with the policy
decision in Gilbert v. State'76 that "it is an abuse of discretion to
award attorneys' fees against a losing party who has in good faith
raised a question of genuine public interest before the courts."'"
The court reasoned that this holding flowed from the articulated
purpose of the rule: "[i]t is not the purpose of Rule 82 to penalize
a party for litigating a good faith claim but rather partially to
compensate the prevailing party where such compensation is
The Gilbert decision, however, rests on infirm
justified."' 7
ground because virtually all litigants, except those found to be
acting in bad faith, perceive that they are advancing their claim or
defense in good faith and that other parties stand to benefit from
their litigation in the future. Nevertheless, in a subsequent case,
the supreme court relied upon the questionable logical foundation
of Gilbert as a basis to authorize full compensation of attorney fees
to successful public interest plaintiffs. 7 '
The court's reasoning that the private attorney general
principle logically flows from the rationale behind Rule 82'" fails
to support adequately the public interest exception. A more
appropriate rationale is that public interest litigants need a financial
incentive to bring socially beneficial suits when the cost of the
litigation exceeds the plaintiff's expected private benefit.' If the
public interest plaintiff must bear the full cost of the proceeding,
the right will be under-enforced. Examples include cases seeking
to enforce rights with special social value, occasions when government agencies lack adequate resources to promote the public
interest, and claims that will benefit a large number of people if
successful 1 2 One-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting in civil rights
claims at the federal level promotes this private attorney general
function."'

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974).
Id. at 1136.
Id. (citing Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973)).
See City of Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 993-94 (Alaska 1977).
Id.
See Rowe, supra note 147, at 662-63.

182. Id. at 662.
183. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the central purpose of
the one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting under Title VII is "to vindicate the national
policy against wrongful discrimination by encouraging the victims to make the
wrongdoers pay at law-assuring that the incentive to such suits will not be
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The problem with public interest fee shifting in Alaska,
however, is that the exemption fundamentally conflicts with the
spirit of the rule. Why should prevailing defendants be denied the
partial attorney fees to which they are entitled under Rule 82,
simply because the case is deemed in the "public interest"? One
alternative approach would be to burden the public treasury with
both the partial fee award owed to prevailing public interest
defendants as well as the difference between the partial and full-fee
award owed to prevailing public interest plaintiffs. However, as to
the latter, it would be both unfair and impractical to collect the fees
from the public rather than the defendants whose very conduct
warrants deterrence."'
In sum, although the stated purpose of Rule 82 fails to justify
the one-sided protection given to special interest plaintiffs, the
public interest exception serves an important function-providing
a financial incentive for certain types of litigation. Therefore, this
"exception" should be retained, but the rule or its stated purpose
should be modified to achieve greater consistency.
D. Settlement Incentive
Alaska's fee-shifting arrangement combines partial two-way fee
shifting, contingency fee arrangements, and an offer-of-settlement
device. The precise impact of Alaska's rules on settlement rates,
therefore, differs from that of a pure "loser pays" system, which
has been the subject of numerous articles. In order to estimate the
possible settlement incentives created by Alaska's unique rules, one
can refer to current economic models. However, the complexity of
Alaska's fee-shifting scheme makes it virtually impossible, using
models that assume risk neutrality," to determine the effect of
Rule 82 on the rate of settlement. One point that does emerge is
that risk aversion may be a crucial factor contributing to higher
settlement rates among middle-income plaintiffs.

reduced by the prospect of attorney's fees that consume the recovery."
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754,761 (1989) (citing
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)).
184. See Rowe, supra note 147, at 673.
185. "Risk aversion," the preference for a certain outcome over a risky one of
equal or greater expected value, is a trait common to plaintiffs, while defendants
often exhibit "risk neutrality" or "risk affinity." See Vargo, supra note 156, at
1593.
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Law-and-economics scholars have analyzed the theoretical
impact of full fee shifting on settlement rates and timing. Circuit
Judge Richard Posner and Professor Steven Shavell have developed
an economic settlement model which shows how the English rule
86
leads "to the counterintuitive result of lower settlement rates."'
The model illustrates that fee shifting adds more factors about
which the parties can disagree during settlement negotiations.
Accordingly, assuming risk neutrality, the parties' bargaining span
will change, pushing them farther apart in their settlement
effort.'1
Professor John Hause reaches the opposite result with his own
more recent model, which assumes that cases tend to cost more in
a fee-shifting jurisdiction." Since fee shifting raises the stakes of
the litigation, it follows that parties will spend more on legal costs
to influence the outcome. 89 Hause finds that settlement becomes
more attractive under a fee-shifting rule because the prospect of
higher trial expenditures increases the cost savings from settling,
offsetting the increased number of factors upon which the parties
As legal expenditures increase,
potentially may disagree."9
parties may also change their predictions regarding their chances of
prevailing in court. It is possible that parties may adopt more
realistic estimates of the likelihood of success at trial, since the
increased legal expenditures will make more information available
to them. These more reasonable expectations will bring the parties
closer together despite the fact that increased expenditures tend to
widen the gap between them. Conversely, the parties may become
more optimistic about their chances of success at trial, thereby
encouraging them to litigate rather than to settle.'9'

186. Bradley L. Smith, Note, ThreeAttorney Fee-ShiftingRules and Contingency

Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154,2155 (1992).
187. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predictingthe Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139, 157.
188. John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlemen4 and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You,

18 J. LEGAL STuD. 157, 176 (1989).
189. The Braeutigam-Owen-Panzar model predicts that absent risk aversion, any
move away from the American rule will increase the costs in a contested case.
Rowe, supra note 187, at 158 (citing Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen, & John
Panzar, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 173, 180).
190. Hause, supra note 188, at 176.
191. Rowe, supra note 187, at 158.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:2

These highly speculative and conflicting effects render an
accurate prediction of the net effect of increased spending rather
difficult."
The current prevailing opinion among law-andeconomics scholars is that the English rule generally leads to higher
settlement rates' 93 because of the expected increase in trial
expenditures and the parties' natural risk aversity. 94 This prediction has only a weak applicability to the Alaska scheme. Since
partial indemnity, rather than full taxation of fees, is the standard
practice in Alaska, it follows that the increase in trial expenditures
will be less than under a pure English rule,195 thereby reducing
the settlement incentive. Consequently, no definitive conclusion
can be drawn about the magnitude or direction of the settlement
effect of the Alaska system, assuming risk neutrality.
Alaska attorneys also regularly employ contingency fee
arrangements, which, to some extent, further complicate settlement
incentives. Often, plaintiffs' attorneys will contract for one-third of
the judgment, plus the attorney fee expenses obtained. Judge
Kleinfeld, while still a practitioner, suggested that the broad
support for Rule 82 among plaintiffs' attorneys indicates that they
have interests different from those of their clients. 96 Kleinfeld
maintained, in other words, that "attorneys on contingent fees
almost always benefit economically from settlement rather than
trial."'" Kdeinfeld's argument, however, applies to jurisdictions
under the American rule as well. The only difference is that under
their retainer agreements, Alaska attorneys may receive a small
additional settlement bonus in the form of one-third of the
schedule-based fee award for settled cases.
Economic modeling also supports the assertion that contingency fee arrangements do not alter the settlement incentive calculus.
One commentator predicts the same result of increased settlements
in two-way fee shifting in a contingency fee context, assuming that
the parties bear the risk of indemnification, rather than their

192. Id.
193. A recent empirical study in Florida, however, concluded that the settlement
rate decreases under the English rule, despite the fact that more claims are initially
dropped. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 165, at 377. The authors attribute this
increased preference for litigation vis-a-vis settlement to the theory that "optimistic
litigants anticipate shifting their fees to their opponents." Id.
194. See Hause, supra note 188, at 176-77; Smith, supra note 186, at 2162.
195. Hause, supra note 188, at 177.
196. Kleinfeld, supra note 152, at 39.
197. Id.
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attorneys.'
This conclusion assumes that the client, not the
attorney, bears the risk of paying the opposing party's attorney
fees 19 9 -an assumption which coincides with the current practice
in Alaska. Consequently, it is doubtful that the contingency fee
arrangement has any greater impact on the settlement incentive in
Alaska than it does in jurisdictions using the American rule.
Rule 68, the offer-of-settlement device, certainly affects the
settlement process in the Alaska system. While the primary
purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage the out-of-court resolution of
cases, the offer device could, ironically, have the opposite effect
when the parties agree about the odds of finding liability but
disagree as to the proper amount of damages. Professor Thomas
Rowe observes that such offer devices under an English system
introduce a new element of disagreement between the parties; fee
shifting becomes linked to the issue of damages rather than simply
to the liability result. Although it is uncertain whether Rule 68
increases the rate of settlement, it does provide an incentive to
make realistic offers as early as possible in the litigation process,
since the offeror may recover fees incurred after the date of the
offer.20 ' Moreover, the offer device should keep the parties
honest in settlement negotiations by encouraging the defendant to
estimate a reasonable offer that the plaintiff would have little
chance of exceeding at trial, and by allowing the plaintiff to "hold
out" for a settlement closer to his or her expected judgment.2"
Earlier and more reasonable settlements, therefore, may be Rule
68's primary contribution to the efficiency of the legal process.
198. Smith, supra note 186, at 2186.
199. Strong arguments exist for placing the indemnification responsibility on the
attorney. In addition to the deterrence rationale, see supra notes 168-173 and
accompanying text, attorneys are able to diversify this risk over their pool of
clients, while individual clients are typically one-time players in litigation who
cannot bear the risk of indemnification adequately. See Note, Fee Simple: A
Proposalto Adopt a Two-way Fee Shift for Low-income Litigants, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1231 (1988); Smith, supra note 186, at 2165.
In contrast, an added burden of attorney indemnification would exacerbate
the already strong settlement incentive which attorneys have in contingency fee
arrangements. Id. at 2166. Additionally, absolving the client of the responsibility
for his or her decisions inverts the role of the attorney as an adviser who must
ultimately abide by a client's decision to accept an offer of settlement. Id. at 2165
(citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(a) (1984)).

200. Rowe, supra note 187, at 167-68.
201. Id. at 169.
202. Id.
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Since the combined effect of Rule 82 and Rule 68 on the rate
of settlement is clouded by offsetting effects on both sides, the
individual characteristics of the plaintiff and defendant assume
overriding significance. In other words, the risk aversion and the
marginal utility of wealth of the respective parties become crucial
considerations.' By increasing the magnitude of parties' potential gains or losses, Rule 82, Rule 79 and Rule 68 combine to raise
the stakes of litigation in Alaska. While "upping the ante" may
make it easier for plaintiffs to retain attorneys in small cases, it may
also "drive out the players whose resources do not allow them to
stay at the table for a long enough time for the probabilities to
work themselves out beyond a few bad hands."2" Repeat players, such as large institutional defendants, are able to insulate
themselves from loss by diversification, but individual plaintiffs are
often one-time participants in the litigation process. 2 5 Consequently, plaintiffs, especially those of moderate means, are likely to
be risk-averse. Fearing a harsh result,' 6 risk-averse plaintiffs
cannot prudently turn down defendants' offers, even if they are
significantly less than the face value of the claim. Amended Rule
82 mitigates this result if the judge varies from the schedule or the
fixed rate pursuant to one or more of the listed factors.2" But if
judges do in fact exercise their equitable powers in future cases,
thereby causing risk-averse players to feel less compelled to settle,
it is difficult to make any general prediction regarding the effect of
Rules 82 and 68 on the rate of settlement.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although problems were evident, the pre-amendment form of
Alaska Civil Rule 82 enjoyed strong attorney support. The
amended version of the rule specifically addresses the rule's harsh
effects on parties of limited means, but the new list of equitable
factors adds an additional layer of complexity to a rule that already
has been the source of numerous appeals.
To justify its considerable administrative expense, Rule 82
must prove its utility as a vehicle for accomplishing important
203. See id. at 168.
204. Kleinfeld, supra note 56, at 52.
205. Rowe, supra note 187, at 142-43.
206. See Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska 1992); see also
supra text accompanying notes 62-64.

207. See ALASKA Crv. R. 82(b)(3).
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policy objectives.' The rule's articulated purpose, partial indemnification of the prevailing party, is unconvincing. Moreover, there
are more appropriate means for punishing bad faith litigants, and
it is unclear whether any significant increase in settlement occurs,
aside from that attributable to risk aversity. Although the rule may
reduce the number of claims filed regardless of merit,' this
result hardly justifies its existence.
The numerous exceptions and factors allowing for equitable
variation now overshadow Rule 82's schedule-based simplicity, its
most attractive aspect. As a result of attempts to retain some
perceived benefits from fee shifting while simultaneously mitigating
its harsh effects, the rule has evolved into such a prolix mechanism
that it is no longer possible to theorize about its effects on the
litigation process with any degree of accuracy. A thorough
empirical study of the effects of amended Rule 82 should be
conducted as soon as possible.210 If the rule cannot be shown to
achieve any useful purpose, it should either be abandoned or
returned to a simpler form that explicitly states its purposes and
justifies its policy tradeoffs.
Kevin Michael Kordziel

208. "[lIt is true that a body of law is more rational and more civilized when
every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitively to an end which it
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to

be stated in words." O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897).
209. See Vargo, supra note 156, at 1635-36.
210. Apparently, the Alaska Judicial Council is scheduled to conduct just such
a study. See Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118, at 6 n.1 (Jan. 7, 1993)
(Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM THE CIVIL RULE 82 QUESTIONNAIRE 21 '
(Responses received as of March 15, 1992)
Does Civil Rule 82 deter people of moderate means from
filing valid claims?
Yes
No
No Answer
Plaintiffs' Attorney
69
127
9
Defendants' Attorney
16
136
12
Attorney for Both
36
108
14
121 (23%) 371 (70%)
35 (7%)
TOTAL
1.

2.

Does Civil Rule 82 put excessive pressure on moderate
income people to settle valid claims?

Plaintiffs' Attorney
Defendants' Attorney
Attorney for Both
TOTAL

Yes
70
21
35
126 (24%)

No
No Answer
124
11
133
10
106
17
363 (69%)
38 (7%)

3.

Is Civil Rule 82 needed in order to discourage frivolous
litigation or do other factors, such as the litigant's own
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and the emotional stress
of participating in a lawsuit, effectively discourage such
cases?212
Yes
No
No Answer
Plaintiffs' Attorney
90
81
34
Defendants' Attorney
90
57
17
Attorney for Both
70
64
24
250 (48%) 202 (38%) 75 (14%)
TOTAL
211. The tabular data summarize the results of the "yes or no" questions from
a survey of the Alaska Bar conducted by the Civil Rules Committee in March of
1992. The Alaska Bar Association includes approximately 3,000 members. Full
questionnaire results are on file with the Alaska Judicial Council.
212. The numerical results of question three should be disregarded, since the
question is written somewhat ambiguously. The high number of "no answer"
responses seems to support this conclusion.
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4.

Should Civil Rule 82 be rescinded?
No Answer
No
Yes
32
169
4
Plaintiffs' Attorney
29
132
Defendants' Attorney
3
26
120
Attorney for Both
12
19 (4%)
TOTAL
87 (16%) 421 (80%)
5.

Should Civil Rule 82 be amended to allow the court to
consider:

a. the non-prevailing party's ability to pay the prevailinEg
party's attorney's fees?
Yes
No
No Answer
87
107
11
Plain tiffs' Attorney
142
7
15
Defe ndants' Attorney
45
97
16
Attor ney for Both
147 (28%) 346 (66%)
34 (6%)
TOTAL
b. the parties' relative ability to pay attorney's fees?
Yes
No
No Answer
tiffs'
Attorney
79
106
20
Plaint
143
Defendants' Attorney
13
105
37
Attorney for Both
129 (25%) 354 (67%)
TOTAL
(8%)

